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“In the past decade, China has become the most important economic actor in this
generally impoverished region. . . . ”




n a chilly but snowless day in January
2019, around 300 men gathered on Bish-
kek’s central Ala-Too Square to demand
an end to a perceived rise in Chinese migration to
Kyrgyzstan. The crowd whistled and cheered as
impassioned speeches against growing Chinese
influence were delivered by the organizers, mem-
bers of the conservative-nationalist group Kyrk
Choro. In an attempt to quell the protest, the dep-
uty chairman of the State Migration Service took
the stage to outline proposed legislation addres-
sing the issue. When scuffles broke out following
the rally, police moved in and detained 21 people.
This was just the latest in a string of protests
against China’s growing influence in the small
Central Asian country. But such events are not
limited to Kyrgyzstan. Nine months later, in its
much bigger neighbor Kazakhstan, demonstra-
tions against Chinese expansionism broke out in
major cities. According to official figures, 57 peo-
ple were arrested. Kazakhstan is no stranger to
anti-China protests: in 2016, nationwide demon-
strations erupted against proposed changes to the
Land Code that would have enabled foreigners to
rent Kazakh land for up to 25 years. In an unchar-
acteristic move, the authorities bowed to public
pressure, and the changes were never enacted.
Is this groundswell of discontent the result of
a combination of nationalist posturing and fear of
the unknown? Or are the polities of Central Asia
really at risk from China?
In the past decade, China has become the
most important economic actor in this generally
impoverished region, making large investments in
infrastructure. Beijing has rebranded its growing
engagement in Central Asia as part of its global
foreign policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). For the nations of the region, greater coop-
eration with China promises many benefits. But
the BRI’s fragmentary and haphazard implementa-
tion suggests that these potential boons could be
squandered.
The BRI was first announced in 2013 by Chinese
President Xi Jinping in a speech at Nazarbayev
University in the Kazakh capital of Astana (since
renamed Nursultan). The aim is to build a vast
network of transportation, energy, and telecom-
munications infrastructure to connect Chinese
manufacturers with consumer markets in Western
Europe.
The BRI comprises two core strands: the Silk
Road Economic Belt (SREB), which traverses the
Eurasian continent, and the Maritime Silk Road,
which runs south through the Strait of Malacca,
around the southern tip of India, across the Red
Sea, and through the Suez Canal to the Mediterra-
nean. Central Asia was initially seen as the site for
BRI’s “hard” infrastructure, such as energy pipe-
lines and rail networks, but is now participating
in the expansion of digital infrastructure like sur-
veillance technology, health apps, and 5G wireless
communications systems. China’s total investment
exceeds $100 billion.
According to Chinese government figures, 138
countries to date, accounting for around a third of
the global population, have signed memoranda of
understanding with Beijing regarding BRI. This vast
investment drive has produced huge benefits for
Chinese businesses. Seven of the world’s ten largest
construction corporations measured by revenue are
headquartered in China; two of the top ten tele-
communications companies are Chinese; and Sino-
pec, China’s state-owned oil and gas corporation, is
the most profitable energy company in the world.
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Central Asia, by contrast, remains a poorly con-
nected region. Due to its Soviet legacy, all oil and
gas pipelines, as well as communications, air, and
rail infrastructure, ran solely to Russia. Following
the Soviet Union’s collapse, the newly indepen-
dent states had no direct links to world markets.
Even thirty years later, the Central Asian econo-
mies—with the exception of Kazakhstan—are still
some of the least diversified in the world.
Investment in infrastructure is desperately
needed in the region; a 2018 United Nations
report found that only 38 percent of roads in Kyr-
gyzstan are tarmacked. Low economic growth and
high unemployment rates prompt many Central
Asians to seek work abroad, mostly in Russia. Emi-
grants constitute 10 to 20 percent of the working
population in countries across the region. Remit-
tances sent home by those migrants account for 52
percent of gross domestic product in Tajikistan
and 34 percent in Kyrgyzstan, among the highest
levels in the world.
The question is whether the BRI will deliver the
benefits Central Asia so clearly needs, or whether
it is designed to primarily
serve China’s own interests.
Answering this requires first
taking a closer look at the
nature of the China-led vision
of international cooperation
embodied in the BRI.
ALTERNATIVE MODEL?
Unlike the multilateralism underpinning the
Western-led liberal international order, Chinese
foreign policy is structured on its preference for
bilateral relations. China seeks individually nego-
tiated agreements with one other party rather than
participation in collective organizations. When
China does engage with groups of other states, it
tends to do so bilaterally through specially created
vehicles, such as the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation and the 17þ1 Forum in Eastern
Europe.
This commitment to bilateralism allows Chinese
actors to negotiate discrete, flexible agreements
with a variety of states, corporations, and agencies,
promoting Chinese products and values according
to the specific context. It is exemplified in the way
the BRI has expanded across the globe. Yet such an
approach lacks coordination, transparency, and
accountability, preventing collective oversight of
Chinese activities—which may be causing the BRI’s
image problem in countries along its route.
In the English-language scholarly literature,
three strands of thought have emerged on the BRI.
The first emphasizes China’s national political
economy, the second focuses on global geopolitics
and the balance of power, and the third fore-
grounds nonstate, subnational, and transnational
actors.
Analysts in the first group view the BRI chiefly as
a response to a crisis in China’s state-led capitalist
system: a $586 billion rescue package for cash-
strapped provinces following the 2007–8 global
financial crisis led to overcapacity in the
manufacturing, construction, and energy sectors.
The BRI, in this view, is primarily an economic
project, a “spatial fix” for Chinese capitalism that
enables China to funnel its excess capital and pro-
duction capacity abroad.
The second perspective notes that China and
other developing countries have long been dissat-
isfied with the imbalance of power across the
existing framework of intergovernmental institu-
tions, which favors Western countries despite their
relative decline in global influence. It proposes that
the BRI is intended to be an
alternative model of global
order, a bid to shift both eco-
nomic and normative power
away from the West. Unlike
Western-led institutions such
as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank,
China typically offers loan packages free of condi-
tions that require implementation of a “good gov-
ernance” agenda or strict social and environmental
protections. Its flexible repayment packages are
often secured with commodities. The BRI is increas-
ing Chinese lending to countries that do not
receive loans from such institutions, and is reshap-
ing the global order in the process.
The third perspective emphasizes the inherently
fragmentary and ungovernable nature of BRI,
which it depicts as a decentralized network of sub-
national economic and political actors. In this
view, Chinese governmental discourse on BRI is
a post hoc attempt to lend coherence to the local-
ized practices of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and subnational governments that operate beyond
the purview of Beijing. The main driver of BRI is
not the Chinese state implementing a coordinated
and premeditated strategy in the national interest.
Rather, the BRI is being steered by provincial gov-
ernment administrations, partially internation-
alized SOEs, and the flows of global capital.
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While all three perspectives reflect truths about
the nature of the BRI, I aim to flesh out the third
view by highlighting the panoply of Chinese actors
involved in the initiative, including lenders, SOEs,
and provincial governments—and by exploring
the projects themselves, many of which were
begun long before the BRI was articulated. A variety
of Chinese actors negotiate bespoke agreements
with overseas counterparts that are often retro-
spectively labeled as part of the BRI.
In Central Asia, this lack of central oversight
combined with an absence of mechanisms promot-
ing transparency and accountability is fueling elite
corruption and popular discontent. It is a trend
that could foment political instability and ulti-
mately prove detrimental to the BRI project.
RESHAPING A REGION
Chinese official discourse on BRI has given
prime importance to the Eurasian region, drawing
on the imagery of the ancient Silk Road, where
traders from both East and West crossed paths
on the Central Asian steppe. The boost to eco-
nomic activity promised by the BRI has the poten-
tial to radically reshape Central Asia. The Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washing-
ton, which tracks all projects enacted under the
auspices of the BRI, has identified 93 to date in
Central Asia that are either fully or partly funded
by Chinese financial institutions. These include
the Five Nations Railway Project connecting
China and Iran across Central Asia, numerous
road improvement projects, and a plethora of
mines, oil refineries, and power stations.
Special economic zones, which aim to attract
foreign direct investment by offering lower taxes
and looser regulations, are emerging across the
region, modeled on the scheme that transformed
the Chinese city of Shenzhen from a humble fish-
ing village into a key node of the global econ-
omy. The most important ones are the Eastern
Gate in Khorgos, Kazakhstan, and the Pengsheng
Industrial Park in Jizzakh, Uzbekistan. Chinese
companies have also invested heavily in agricul-
tural projects: expanding farms into Tajikistan,
establishing demonstration parks in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, and setting up processing facil-
ities across the region.
As it cultivates these interests in Central Asia,
Beijing is increasing security assistance to the
region’s states. One of the central strategic interests
underlying Chinese engagement is in bolstering
the region’s security through rapid economic
development. Central Asia’s main strategic impor-
tance to China stems from its proximity to the
far-western Chinese region of Xinjiang, which
shares borders with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Kazakhstan, as well as Afghanistan.
Xinjiang is largely inhabited by Uighur Mus-
lims, who share many ethnic and cultural similar-
ities with their Central Asian neighbors. According
to official figures, the average economic growth
rate in Xinjiang is 8.5 percent, approximately two
percentage points above the national average. But
since the 1990s, the region periodically has been
beset by social unrest and terror attacks. The cen-
tral government has dramatically increased its
security presence and established what it calls
vocational education and training centers for
Uighur Muslims. Western researchers and human
rights activists allege that they are really concen-
tration camps.
Alongside their myriad infrastructure projects,
Chinese companies have invested large sums in
surveillance technologies that have been rolled out
domestically under the banner of creating “smart
cities” and are being marketed abroad as part of
the Digital Silk Road. By the end of 2020, Huawei
Technologies, the world’s largest telecommunica-
tions equipment manufacturer, will have invested
$1 billion in Uzbekistan’s digital infrastructure,
in areas ranging from e-governance to facial-
recognition software. A similar Huawei surveil-
lance system is already in operation in the Tajik
capital of Dushanbe and in shopping centers in
a number of cities in Kazakhstan. In Kyrgyzstan,
Chinese-made surveillance software is in use with
Russian-installed cameras.
China has also been strengthening military
cooperation in the region through increased arms
sales and a growing number of bilateral military
exercises. In a secretive 2019 agreement, Tajiki-
stan’s government authorized China to build
a training center, 11 outposts, and 30 to 40 smaller
guard posts on the Tajik–Afghan border.
AGGRESSIVE ACTORS
There is no central Chinese institution coordi-
nating the BRI. More than ten national govern-
ment agencies are responsible for managing
different aspects of the initiative, including the
ministries of foreign affairs, culture, and com-
merce, as well as the recently created China Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency,
which seeks to bring Beijing’s foreign aid commit-
ments closer in line with its foreign policy. For
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BRI implementation, the three most important
sets of organizations are China-owned or -led
financial institutions, state-owned enterprises,
and provincial-level governments.
Numerous Chinese or China-led lenders are
involved in BRI. They include policy banks, such
as the Export-Import Bank of China (ExIm Bank)
and the China Development Bank; state-owned
banks, including the China Construction Bank
and the Agricultural Bank of China; state-owned
funds, such as the Silk Road Fund; and China-led
multilateral development banks, such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New
Development Bank.
Not all of these entities are involved to the same
extent. The AIIB, established to support BRI devel-
opment projects, has invested only $16 billion,
according to its website. Meanwhile, the ExIm Bank
had lent $149 billion by April 2019, reflecting Chi-
na’s general preference for bilateral arrangements
over working through multilateral institutions.
Chinese SOEs are central to the BRI’s economic
objective of creating an attractive external envi-
ronment for Chinese trade.
They are the companies most
often contracted to construct
the new infrastructure. By
2018, Chinese SOEs had been
awarded half of all BRI pro-
jects, worth 70 percent of their
total value.
These companies operate on a logic different
from that of Western commercial enterprises.
Since their financial security is often guaranteed
by the government, they are able to engage in risk-
ier projects, and are often accused by Western in-
terests of violating World Trade Organization
(WTO) limits on state aid. However, they are by
no means fully under the control of Beijing. Just
like other profit-making enterprises, they are also
guided by commercial interests, local business
opportunities, and the ambitions of their leaders.
Chinese provincial governments contribute to
the BRI’s expansion by managing the regulations
for provincial-level SOEs and seeking out foreign
projects that will drive local economic growth.
Almost all provinces have developed their own BRI
strategies and have looked for ways to internation-
alize their local economies. Xinjiang’s BRI-related
internationalization strategy is especially ambi-
tious: not only is the region a central node in the
SREB, it is also the starting point for the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor, which links the
seaport at Gwadar on Pakistan’s coast with Kash-
gar in southern Xinjiang.
While each of these three sets of actors—the
lending institutions, state-owned enterprises, and
provincial administrations—has its own priorities
and operating logic, they can work together infor-
mally on behalf of Chinese interests overseas.
Since institutions like the ExIm Bank are able to
borrow at preferential rates, they can provide
cheap credit to Chinese companies bidding for BRI
projects, which in turn gives Chinese SOEs and
private enterprises a comparative advantage in
international tendering processes.
Many BRI projects are a result of bottom-up lob-
bying by individual companies that approach pro-
vincial governments with project proposals. The
specifics of this process are notoriously opaque.
RETROSPECTIVE REBRANDING
The common perception that the BRI grew out
of a grand strategy is further undermined by the
fact that projects retrospectively rebranded as
part of the initiative had been conceived much
earlier. Although it was ini-
tially announced in 2013
(then called One Belt One
Road in English, a direct
translation of the Chinese yi
dai yi lu), earlier iterations of
the policy had been in oper-
ation since the 1990s. In 1999, President Jiang
Zemin initiated the Going Out Policy, which
encouraged Chinese SOEs to invest internation-
ally. The policy made China one of the world’s
top overseas investors. In the same year, Jiang
also introduced the Great Western Development
Project, or “Go West” campaign, a comprehensive
development plan for China’s impoverished west-
ern regions. Infrastructure development was a key
element of the campaign.
During the 2000s, the central government por-
trayed Xinjiang as a “Continental Eurasian Land-
Bridge” connecting the rest of China with markets
in Europe and Central Asia. Under the Go West
Campaign, substantial Chinese investment was
already flowing into Central Asia. By 2008, five
years before the BRI was announced, China had
already surpassed Russia as the largest investor
in the region. The bulk of the investment allocated
through the Go West policy was devoted to large
energy and infrastructure projects such as power
stations, railways, pipelines, and highways. Most
of these have since been relabeled as BRI projects.
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Examples of this relabeling practice abound.
The Kara-Balta oil refinery—operated by an SOE,
the Jun Da China Petrol Company, and framed as
a signature BRI project in Central Asia—was begun
in 2012. The Pengsheng Industrial Park in
Uzbekistan, established in 2009, was later linked
to the BRI. The Yu’Xin’Ou Railway, a transcontinen-
tal freight corridor linking Chongqing to Europe
via Xinjiang, opened in 2012 and was also later
rebranded as a BRI project. A transit hub in Khorgos,
on Xinjiang’s northern border with Kazakhstan,
now a central BRI “land port,” had been under
development since 2005.
There are many more. The Chinese government
has not established criteria for what constitutes
a BRI project, so provincial governments and cor-
porations can frame virtually any project as being
part of the initiative.
AN AMBIVALENT RECEPTION
While the BRI’s potential benefits for Central
Asian economies are obvious, local populations
remain deeply suspicious of their large eastern
neighbor. For them, China remains something of
an unknown entity after its decades of regional
isolation following the Sino-Soviet split and resul-
tant anti-Chinese propaganda.
Local political elites often act as gatekeepers to BRI
projects. They are able to combine inner knowledge
of patronage networks with technical understanding
of transnational finance, and with their ability to
bypass anti–money laundering laws, in order to
secure access to Chinese companies—and payoffs
for their efforts. But they are often caught in a bind.
They want investment in much-needed infrastruc-
ture, and they enjoy the personal financial gains that
come with Chinese contracts. But they also need to
be seen as responsive to the concerns of their
citizens.
Chinese investments have rendered this region,
whose politics was already characterized by infor-
mal deal-making among elites, even more prone to
clientelism and corruption. Research I conducted
with John Heathershaw and Alexander Cooley
demonstrated that the practices of Chinese trans-
national corporations and SOEs in the region are
determined by localized practices of corruption
and graft rather than by directives from Beijing.
In Kyrgyzstan, few political leaders have been
untouched by China-related corruption. The
country’s second president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev,
publicly criticized the regime of his predecessor,
Atambek Akayev, for ceding over 1,250 square
kilometers of land to China. But he subsequently
reversed himself under pressure from the Chinese
embassy, retracting his comments and confirming
his support for bilateral agreements with Beijing.
Bakiyev’s successor, Almazbek Atambayev, was
embroiled in another scandal involving a Chinese
investment. A power plant built by a Chinese com-
pany without going through a tendering process
broke down in January 2018, depriving millions of
heating during a bitter winter.
Kyrgyzstan’s current president, Soronbay Jeenbe-
kov, has been linked to Chinese businessman Aier-
ken Saimaiti, who was assassinated in Istanbul in
November 2019 after allegedly transferring almost
$1 billion out of Kyrgyzstan’s public coffers. The
only Kyrgyz president to have avoided accusations
of China-related graft happens to be the country’s
only female president to date, Roza Otunbayeva,
who briefly held power between 2010 and 2011.
During my fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan studying
local perceptions of China, I found that awareness
of this high-level corruption was widespread.
Ordinary citizens felt they were missing out on the
benefits of Chinese investment. Chinese compa-
nies continued to bring in their own workers,
while local laborers remained unemployed and
in poverty. It was thought that the only locals truly
benefiting from the Chinese presence were the
political elites who could line their pockets with
Chinese cash.
This public dissatisfaction breeds intermittent
demonstrations that are nominally anti-Chinese,
but often express concerns about local politicians’
dealings with China. A number of protests have
been sparked by environmental degradation caused
by Chinese-run infrastructure projects. In August
2019, after livestock mysteriously began dying off,
clashes broke out between Chinese mine workers
and locals at a Chinese-operated gold mine in Kyr-
gyzstan’s Naryn province.
In February 2020, shortly before the COVID-19
pandemic made such public gatherings impossible,
nearly 1,000 protesters in Naryn, which borders
China and hosts a struggling special economic
zone, demanded the cancellation of plans to allow
China to build a $275 million logistics hub. The
government soon met the protesters’ demand.
Despite China’s efforts to promote its culture
through its 11 Confucius Institutes in Central
Asia, generous scholarships for study in China,
and programs that facilitate visits to China by Cen-
tral Asian public officials, Sinophobia runs deep
and does not appear to be abating. One Bishkek
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resident told me, “In my childhood, if we didn’t eat
the food that our grandmother prepared, she
would scare us by saying that the Chinese will
come.”
Chinese officials know that their image in the
region is poor, but they are adept at playing a long
game. As long as local elites take Chinese money,
they will be the ones who have to manage—and
possibly suppress—the simmering discontent.
PANDEMIC COMPLICATIONS
Repercussions from the COVID-19 pandemic are
likely to compound the challenges of China–Cen-
tral Asia cooperation. At the time of this writing,
the pandemic is resurgent in the region following
an easing of lockdowns.
Before the crisis, China was the destination for
a fifth of all Central Asian exports and the source
of a third of the region’s imports. How the Chinese
economy weathers the pandemic-induced storm
will have a huge impact on Central Asian econo-
mies. Although Chinese gross domestic product
shrank by 6.8 percent in the first quarter of
2020, compared with a year earlier, it rebounded
to grow 3.2 percent in the sec-
ond quarter. Annual growth is
expected to be 1.8 percent,
substantially lower than the
usual rate of 6–8 percent.
The WTO expects global
trade to fall by 32 percent
this year. Developing coun-
tries, including those in Central Asia, are likely
to be hardest hit. The largely remittance-based
economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are under
pressure as many migrant workers are laid off from
jobs in Russia, while the resource-based economies
of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan
suffer from plummeting oil and gas prices.
Two strategies in response to the pandemic are
available to Chinese economic planners. They may
take advantage of the dire global economic situa-
tion and purchase more failing assets abroad,
which will lead to greater levels of engagement
in Central Asia and an acceleration of the BRI. Or
they may rein in overseas loans and development
projects and turn their focus inward. There is evi-
dence that different actors are pursuing different
strategies, which reinforces the conclusion that
Chinese organizations rarely follow a coherent,
centrally decided directive.
In May, the Chinese government announced
a $500 billion domestic stimulus package,
financed by issuing special bonds for pandemic
relief and local government bonds for infrastruc-
ture projects. The infrastructure funding has kick-
started a revival of the Chinese construction
industry. Local governments on China’s periphery
could expand their already extensive cross-border
collaboration with low-income neighboring coun-
tries, such as those of Central Asia, that are des-
perate for infrastructure and investment. Such an
expansion occurred following the 2008 financial
crisis. While BRI construction has temporarily
ground to a halt, the evidence suggests that once
travel restrictions are lifted, BRI-related activities
will resume with renewed zeal.
But Chinese investments abroad were already
slowing in 2019 due to the US–China trade war.
Low levels of liquidity, as well as directives to SOEs
and provincial governments to channel what cash
they do have into the domestic economy, could
accelerate this trend. That might force a temporary
lull in engagement in Central Asia. Given the
entanglement of Chinese and Central Asian econ-
omies, even a brief pause in
cooperation could have
far-reaching social and polit-
ical consequences. But the
fundamentally decentralized
nature of BRI is more likely
to mean a ramping up of Chi-
nese overseas activities in
some areas and withdrawal from others.
This all adds up to a picture of the BRI that
contrasts with Beijing’s narrative of win-win coop-
eration, carefully planned and executed from the
center. On the ground in Central Asia, the BRI is
a messy, bottom-up, contradictory network of
transnational clientelist relationships and semi-
autonomous profit-seeking institutions, which
serves to enrich local political elites while
fueling resentment and suspicion among local
populations. Whether their concerns can be
allayed by reforms of the tendering process and
new oversight mechanisms remains to be seen.
The Chinese leadership is certainly aware of
these problems. Whatever happens, we can be rea-
sonably confident that China-led development as
a model of world order will continue to gain influ-
ence as developing countries look for leadership in
an increasingly post-Western world. &
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